If history is any guide to current policy, Asean should reconsider its push for Burmese participation at the upcoming Asia Europe Meeting (Asem) in October.
In 1997, Asean admitted Burma irrespective of mounting international criticism, arguing that the military regime would gradually transform itself.
During the last seven years, the Burmese military regime, calling itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), found its Asean membership so comfortable that it finally dared to attack and arrest democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, in May 2003. There remains a brutal dictatorship in Burma leaning towards what EU Commissioner Chris Patten
has called “the explosive creation of another failed state”.
When Asean admitted Burma, it listed a number of geopolitical and economic reasons.
First, Asean argued that membership could effectively keep Burma out of the orbit of Chinese influence. Not only did Asean fail to stop Rangoon from cosying up to Beijing, but nowadays the SPDC has become totally dependent upon Chinese aid in shoring up its failing economy and bloated military.
Second, Asean thought that Burma could slowly reform its planned economy under Asean Free Trade Area obligations. No reforms yet. Alas, the SPDC has sought a rent-seeking economic model in which it rewards cronies with trade licences and industrial permits while opening up the country’s rich
natural resources to a fire sale. Some Asean countries may have benefited exceedingly from its preferential access to Burma’s rich natural resources.
Finally, Asean made the logical argument that cooperation was needed to address transnational effects of domestic problems in Burma. To date, no amount of cooperation has been able to stem the problems of increased drug trafficking, a worsening HIV/Aids epidemic and the unending saga of refugee and migrant outflows across Burmese borders.
The SPDC’s track record should be particularly instructive for the upcoming Asem summit. Asean must also weigh the greater crisis coming in 2006, when Burma takes the chairmanship.
The US has already stated categorically that it will not go to Rangoon under the present military rule, and the EU partners will stay away in solidarity, causing a major diplomatic catastrophe for Asean.
The SPDC’s vision for the future state typically looks like a centralised command system. It would be extremely imprudent for Asean to be constrained by the principles of non-interference while allowing the SPDC to consolidate their constitutional garrison state in Asean’s backyard.
Thus, a “ten minus one” formula should be considered for future affairs of Asean. It is high time that Asean exercise the principle of “sufficient consensus” to unhook the Burmese generals from playing hostage diplomacy. Instead of pushing for automatic membership for Burma, Asean could make a
compromise with the European Union to delay Burmese participation.
In fact, the Asem summit provides a very timely opportunity for Asean to extract real commitment from the Burmese military regime.
Zaw Oo is research director of the Burma Fund.