So-called democracy under authoritarian regimes has had many colorful names. Chile had “protected democracy.” In Suharto’s Indonesia, it was “guided democracy.” In Libya, it was called “managed democracy.” In Burma, under Ne Win it was labeled “democratic socialism” under one-party rule.

As democracies in all but name, all failed miserably. But appalling polities continue to keep up the pretence. Burma is a case in point. Sooner or later, the Burmese will experience “disciplined democracy”-the generals’ new brand of the ideology.

If the junta has its way, the first step of its “road map to democracy”-the current session of the off-on National Convention to draw up a new constitution-may finish its work by year’s end. That means Burma will have a new constitution to succeed the one suspended after the failed democratic upheaval in 1988.

What would it mean? Would the country have a new form of democracy, perhaps with a general election, before a Rangoon-chaired Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, summit in November 2006? Let’s see.

For a start, any election would be for only 75% of parliament. The rest would be hand-picked by the military, which guarantees itself a dominant role in a new government anyway. Despite constitutional guarantees for some forms of rights and freedoms we know about, there will still be no free press, and in reality there will be no rule of law or freedom from political prosecution. Lawmakers will also find it very hard to amend the constitution or censure the government.

According to Thein Oo, a lawyer and exiled member of parliament, from what is already known about the new constitution, women, children, workers, farmers and youth will enjoy some basic rights for the first time in more than 40 years.

Ethnic minorities will also enjoy some form of self-determination in their own self-administered regions with state assemblies. Theoretically, ethnic groups will have a say in their own affairs for the first time since independence in 1948.

The constitution includes an article that allows judicial review. “Even the 1947 constitution lacks such a provision,” said Thein Oo. With at least some representation in a parliament previously controlled completely by the military, Burmese civilians will have a voice in public affairs.

The bad news is that all these freedoms and rights will be “disciplined.” The armed forces chief of staff will have more political power than the elected president, who will also be required to be from the military. The military will be allowed to manage its own affairs, including its budget.

Worse, the constitution will not stipulate elections for local governments. Instead, the military will appoint officials who are likely to be both active and ex-military men. This will surely hamper any move towards grassroots democracy.

There will also be no “constitutional codes,” according to Hkun Okker, a constitutional expert who is General Secretary of the opposition National Democratic Front. That means there are no clear, definitive words for constitutional rights and principles. “This leaves such clauses open to manipulative interpretation by the military,” he pointed out.

Repressive state laws, such as the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act and the 1975 State Protection Law are likely to remain. The laws give the state all-embracing powers.

In 1999, the exiled Burma Lawyer Council accused the regime of attempting to retain “an authoritarian centralist government with very few checks and balances” through the new constitution. Indeed, this appears to be what the Burmese can expect:  “democracy,” yes-but with an even larger dose of “discipline.”

All laws will be subject to broad interpretation by the military. In other words, whatever “democracy” emerges will only be tolerated as long as it doesn’t interfere with what the military regards as its prerogatives. For Burmese, democracy will remain an enduring dream.

Aung Naing Oo is a research associate with Washington-based The Burma Fund.