A struggle for control between the top two generals, growing tension between Rangoon and the ceasefire groups, and the regime’s failure to catch the culprits behind the bomb blast in Rangoon have cast a long shadow over the military’s future.

Since the arrest of former prime minister Khin Nyunt last October, the regime has tightened control and centralised the command structure within the army.

The defence ministry controls everything now. The United Nations and international aid organisations in Rangoon are increasingly worried that the regime may even be considering throwing them out.

Senior General Than Shwe has also been working on a major shake-up of the army for months now, in preparation towards the establishment of a new military headquarters at Pyinmana, some 600 kilometres north of Rangoon in central Burma.

The supreme command is also likely to be divided into north and south.

The power and authority of the regional commanders has been significantly increased since the last quarterly meeting of the ruling State Peace and Development Council in late April. The number of senior officers under their command has been doubled.

Three new colonels have been appointed to each regional headquarters in charge of military intelligence, inspection, public relations and the militia.

The power of the regional commanders has been restored to the pre-2001 days when the intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, streamlined the army and tried to rein in the regional commanders.

But it is unlikely that the regional commanders will be elevated again and sit on the ruling council.

The restructuring is also largely the result of the struggle between the top two generals - Than Shwe and Maung Aye - for power over the army command.

Six of the regional commanders were recently moved around. Usually the regional commanders are replaced and brought back to Rangoon when their term comes to an end. Normally they are effectively kicked upstairs.

But the current reshuffle largely leaves the structure and power relations between the two top generals unchanged. This reflects the fragility at the top and the difficulty the two generals have in agreeing to change.

The key position yet to be resolved between the two is the crucial Rangoon command, currently controlled by a Than Shwe loyalist, Major-General Myint Swe, who is also in charge of the new Military Intelligence branch.

He is expected to retain his intelligence command and be appointed to the SPDC.

He is expected to be replaced within the next few weeks by a Maung Aye supporter, the northern commander Maung Maung Swe, according to Kachin sources.

There are major changes to the SPDC and a further cabinet reshuffle in the pipeline, according to diplomats in Rangoon. Promotions that were made six months ago have been ratified and become official. It is usual practice for officers to spend a six months’ probation period before their new rank is confirmed.

Already Prime Minister Soe Win has been made a full general and Rangoon commander Myint Swe has become lieutenant-general.

These promotions immediately followed the arrest of Khin Nyunt last October and involve Than Shwe’s supporters.

But the delicate balance between the two top generals has swung back towards Maung Aye since then - not that he is trying to overthrow the man at the top. “It’s a struggle for supremacy,” said an Asian diplomat based in Rangoon.

“Maung Aye does not want Than Shwe to feel openly threatened, he does not want to confront him outright, but he does want to clip his powerbase,” said a senior Asian diplomat with strong ties to the Burmese junta.

The senior general has tried to use the third most powerful general, the military chief-of-staff, General Thura Shwe Mann, to balance Maung Aye’s influence, much in the same way as he previously used Khin Nyunt.

The difference this time is that Thura Shwe Mann has none of the prestige, vision or credibility that the former intelligence chief did.

Thura Shwe Mann has little credibility within the army junior officers and the rank and file despise him, according to Burmese military sources.

“He is a very, very stupid man,” a senior Burmese military officer recently said privately. But it is the rapacious corruption of his sons that has particularly angered other senior military figures, especially Maung Aye.

In the next few weeks the promotions and reshuffle of commanders may reveal the outcome of the struggle for power within the military.

But one thing is certain: it is unlikely to affect the overall strategy, especially towards the international community.

There are growing signs within the junta that they are returning to the isolationism of the past. Already the regime has snubbed the United Nations. The UN’s special envoy for Burma, Razali Ismail, who reports directly back to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has been refused permission to visit Burma since the first week of March last year. There is no likelihood of him returning any time soon. The senior general reportedly told Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra last December that Mr Razali would not be allowed back.

The UN special rapporteur for human rights in Burma, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, has also been effectively shut out as well. The last time he was allowed back was in November 2003.

For a while the regime, especially Khin Nyunt, favoured him because of his preparedness to say openly that he opposed isolation and favoured conversation. But he has been repeatedly denied access to Burma over the past 18 months.

This is largely because the current regime does not favour talking with anyone: the UN, the ethnic groups or the pro-democracy political parties.

More crucially, it reflects their chauvinistic and xenophobic approach. They have no interest in dealing with difficult foreigners or the international community.

The latest International Labour Organisation’s move, effectively a call from the recent meeting in Geneva for members to impose sanctions against the regime because of its failure to deal with forced labour, has hardened the top generals’ resolve to ignore international pressure.

It may also convince the regime to break links with the international community altogether.

Some top military leaders are seriously considering throwing out the ILO, according to Burmese government sources. But ILO insiders in Geneva hope cooler heads may yet prevail.

What is more likely is that the regime will simply make it increasingly difficult for the ILO office in Rangoon to carry out its work. This would put pressure on the organisation to pull out on its own accord.

All the UN agencies and international aid organisations in Rangoon are finding it hard to operate. Their staff have difficulties getting permission to travel to their projects, especially in areas where there are ceasefire groups.

A planned trip last month by the UN drugs chief in Rangoon and several top Burmese police chiefs to Shan state was cancelled at the last moment.

Requests to the various ministries are lost in the bureaucracy.

“The situation is bad and can only get worse,” a Western aid expert said recently.

While the top two generals continue to jockey for power, the political situation in Burma will also only get worse.

Even if the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations manage to continue to work in the country, malnutrition and HIV/Aids will increase as the military regime puts it emphasis on control rather than development.