Bangkok: Worried that North Korea’s heated nuclear row with the US could end in war, sending millions of refugees across its border, China nudged its Stalinist ally to the negotiating table. Burma, even less stable, could cause China similar trouble. It is already costing restless, inland China jobs by blocking trade to India. Economic necessity and fear of western intervention will drive China to push for change in Burma.

Though China professes no interest in other countries’ affairs, its actions suggest otherwise. It brokered a deal bringing peace to Cambodia in 1990 including not only the Cambodian protagonists but also Thailand and Vietnam. That multilateral experience perhaps paved the way for a sea change in Chinese diplomacy from favoring bilateral engagement to multilateral diplomacy that began to make its mark from 1995.

Since then China has joined hands with other states in regional organizations like the Asean Regional Forum, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It also took a multilateral approach to trade talks, working towards a free trade deal with Asean.

China has also acceded to numerous UN conventions on human rights, children’s and women’s rights. Though laws and people’s rights are improving there is still a long way to go, as senior officials admit.

In the face of much huffing, puffing and sword waving by the US about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, China walked off the sidelines into the thick of the dispute. It brought reclusive ally North Korea and the US to the table, and accepted Japanese and Russian involvement.

China was not simply trying to protect an ally, but trying to save itself from more trouble that would burden its economy. It is already struggling under the weight of thousands of North Korean refugees fleeing starvation and brutality. A conflict or collapse of North Korea could well send millions splashing across the Yalu River into China’s depressed northeast.

Burma, though not posing a serious nuclear threat, yet, is another wildcard on the border of China, a state that prizes stability above all else. Burma, with its superstitious generals, deep ethnic fissures and smoldering jungle wars, is a more complex and less predictable problem than homogenous North Korea and its leadership cult.

Even to China, nominal friend and leading weapons supplier, Burma remains inscrutable. Its hard work currying favour with Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, who also headed Military Intelligence, apparently went to waste when the army purged him in a coup and disbanded his despised spy agency last October.

Khin Nyunt’s plunge starkly highlights the rivalries, suspicions and jealousies within the military. They are a recipe for conflict. That is both a lesson and warning of Burma’s impenetrable intrigue and inherent instability. Chaos is a constant spectre in the lands of the Irrawaddy.

Indeed such tensions have been the Achilles heel of many a third-world military, leading to collapse and civil war. Should that come to pass, Burma will resemble Afghanistan or Congo, with at least one sure result: straggly refugees heading for the relative safety of China and Thailand.

Western intervention, perhaps through the UN, though unlikely right now, certainly cannot be ruled out later. It was not so long ago that intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq was unthinkable.

Calls for action by South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former Czech president Vaclav Havel on September 20 followed a closed-door Burma policy review by the British government. Burma, clearly, is an issue of growing concern to many in the West.

China will struggle to let Western intervention pass given the almost certain loss of its strategic listening post and ports for its navy. Their loss would be inconvenient but not a catastrophe. Confronting the West would be risking a military showdown and damage to China’s economy which would probably cost jobs.

Intelligence stations and ship replenishment do not create jobs, crucial to easing social unrest. Creating jobs and raising wages have kept the communist party in power. Employment is a security issue.

Like a landlocked country, inland China’s economy suffers because it is far from ports and export markets. Despite government incentives and encouragement, investors still prefer the booming east coast, to remote central and western provinces. Opening roads and railways across Burma to India, and sea routes from Burma’s ports to the West, would cut shipping costs and time, boost trade, draw investment and create jobs.

Such routes are clearly on the minds of planners in Beijing. At Ruili, a Chinese trading post on the Burma border, a broad customs and immigration checkpoint already awaits an expressway, along with a railway, part of a new nationwide network announced early this year.

But going beyond Ruili to the coast and India requires peace and security, something Burma’s junta, despite its 400,000 strong army and huge military spending, is unable or unwilling to impose.

Sooner rather than later economic necessity will push China to take the initiative to bring peace and stability to Burma. That means forcing Burma’s rulers to change their policies, or changing the rulers-almost certainly in coalition with concerned states, especially India, and Burmese opposition groups. Either way, taking the lead will give China a greater chance to shape what follows.