1. From 1994 to 2007, the United Nations General Assembly successively adopted resolutions on Burma, that call [for the Burmese military regime] to;

(a) Implement the result of the 1990 elections,

(b) Establish a democratic country, and

(c) Commence the meaningful political dialogue (with democratic opposition parties).

On 11 October 2007, the United Nations Security Council also issued a Presidential Statement on the situation in Burma, in which the Security Council called (for the Burmese military government) to;

(1) Release all political prisoners and detainees, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, immediately and unconditionally, and

(2) Commence meaningful political dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, political parties and ethnic leaders, immediately.

We found no tangible progress from the recent visit of Mr. Ibrahim Gambari, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, on 18-23 August, which was the sixth of its kind, to facilitate the UNGA resolutions and UNSC Presidential Statement on Burma.

2. During the visit, Mr. Gambari was not able to meet with senior officials of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) [official name of the Burmese military regime], who are the real decision makers. He also couldn’t meet and discuss the situation with ethnic political parties that won significant seats in the 1990 elections, ethnic leaders, as well as leaders of democracy forces. He only followed the arrangements of the SPDC and spent most of the time, which is precious and irreplaceable, without any benefit.

3. When the leaders of the NLD met Mr. Gambari (on 20 August), NLD leaders explained that the 1990 multi-party election results, which represented the decision and free will of the voters, should not be ignored, and that without honoring the free will of the people of Burma demonstrated in the 1990 election, establishing a democratic country could not be possible, and asked him how would he considered the 1990 election result. Mr. Gambari didn’t answer that question.

4. NLD leaders also explained to him that the 2008 constitution, which was approved by the SPDC, is actually written by the SPDC without having the right to do so, that the referendum held in May 2008 was also not a process in which the people could express their real desire, but a step to approve the constitution forcibly by use of fraud, threats and vote-rigging, and that the NLD has already declared clearly that it would not recognize the referendum and the constitution. Therefore, NLD leaders asked Mr. Gambari not to consider and speak for the upcoming election.

5. Despite our concerns, when he met with the Spokes Authoritative Team of the SPDC, Mr. Gambari advised that “the SPDC should accept expertise from the United Nations in the general election to be held in 2010 in order to win the trust of the international community”, and “UN would like to coordinate matters for rendering expertise after the election commission has been formed.” Hence, general dissatisfactions (on his performance) among the Burmese people are now growing.

6. The NLD Chairman told Mr. Gambari that for him to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is within the control of the SPDC, [as she is a detainee of the regime].  However, Mr. Gambari requested the NLD to find a way for him to meet with her. Then, NLD Chairman and Secretary told him to try to have a meeting between the NLD leaders and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, with the impression that there may be a good result if Mr. Gambari meets Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

7. Mr. Gambari came to Burma six times with his diplomatic mission. However, we found no development whatsoever as of today such as;

(1) Release of all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,

(2) Realizing of meaningful political dialogue between the SPDC, and democracy forces including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and

(3) Democratization in Burma.

As per decision made by the Central Executive Committee meeting on 28 August 2008,

Central Executive Committee
National League for Democracy
No. 97B West Shwegondaing Street
Bahan Township, Rangoon