Just the faint hope that Aung San Suu Kyi may be released soon has caused a stir of excitement among Burmese people. If she really is freed, it will dramatically enliven Burma’s political scene. But don’t expect junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe to turn the jail key in its lock just yet.

“There is a plan to release her soon … so she can organize her party,” Min Lwin, a Burmese Foreign Ministry official, said recently. Responding to his remark, Nyan Win, a spokesperson for Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy, told The Irrawaddy, “This is what many people wanted to hear.”

But most Burmese know better than to get their hopes up. In general, the more skeptical you are of the regime’s words, the closer you will be to understanding their true intentions. Past experience has shown repeatedly that if you expect deception from the junta, chances are you won’t be disappointed.

This is not to say that Suu Kyi won’t be freed. Certainly, her release is a top priority for the regime’s new dialogue partner, the US government. According to US officials, President Barack Obama will repeat his call for Suu Kyi’s release when he meets Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein and other regional leaders in Singapore next Sunday.

Ultimately, however, the matter rests with Than Shwe, who will make his decision based on a careful risk-benefit analysis. If he is confident that Suu Kyi will not derail his carefully laid plans for a military-led, quasi-civilian government after next year’s election, he may see fit to release her. Otherwise, it simply won’t happen.

The trouble is that Suu Kyi is still a potent force in Burmese politics. Merely by appearing in public, she is capable of unleashing a pent-up desire for genuine democracy—the very thing the regime fears most. Even if her movements are severely restricted, as they were when she was released in 1995 and 2002, people will gather around her as a beacon of hope.

This is the scenario that the generals dread more than any other, especially now that they are coming to the final stages of their exit strategy. After 20 years of denying the will of the Burmese people and committing untold atrocities to hold onto power, they know that next year’s election must go exactly as planned. This means installing a new regime that is loyal to the current leadership, allowing the top generals to retire without fear of reprisal.

As he approaches the finish line, Than Shwe is warier than ever of being tripped up by Suu Kyi’s immense popularity. This is why he extended her house arrest by 18 months earlier this year, on the ridiculous pretext that she violated the terms of her detention by allowing an American intruder to stay overnight on her property. She is now set to remain under house arrest until well after next year’s election.

However, since Suu Kyi was sentenced in August, several things have changed. The most important was the Obama administration’s announcement in September that it would begin to directly engage the regime, reversing Washington’s longstanding policy of isolating the generals. Although US sanctions remain in place, there is now at least a possibility they will be lifted, if Than Shwe plays his cards right.

Another significant change has come from Suu Kyi herself. In September, she expressed a willingness to help the junta remove sanctions, requesting permission to meet with foreign diplomats and members of her party to discuss the issue. This was granted, and more recently, she thanked the junta for allowing her to meet a US delegation led by US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell last week.

This new, more compromising tone comes as the regime in Naypyidaw continues to signal that it may relax Suu Kyi’s detention if, as Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein put it during a regional summit in October, she “maintains a good attitude.”

Actually, it was Thein Sein’s boss, Than Shwe, who first suggested that Suu Kyi might get time off for good behavior. Shortly after she was found guilty of the charges against her, a letter from the senior general was read out in court, reducing her original three-year sentence by half and holding out the possibility of a further reduction if she “behaved well.”

When she contacted Than Shwe by letter in September, she let him know that she understood what he meant by “good behavior.” She focused entirely on the issue of sanctions, and avoided mentioning the upcoming election and the controversial 2008 Constitution.

At this stage, it is difficult to tell how long this very tentative détente will last. According to sources close to the generals, Than Shwe’s reaction to Suu Kyi’s overtures has been “so far, so good.” But this could suddenly change, and the current situation could deteriorate rapidly, depending on the mood of the man who holds absolute power over Burma.

Knowing this, Suu Kyi has proceeded carefully. But as the leader of Burma’s pro-democracy forces, sooner or later she will have to raise sensitive issues like the election and the Constitution.

For its part, the Obama administration has also moved forward cautiously in its talks with the regime. It said it would not push for a review of the Constitution, saying that this should be discussed as part of a “national dialogue.”

Although Than Shwe appears to have relaxed his guard somewhat, it is important not to underestimate his capacity for manipulation.

It seems fairly obvious what he wants—the removal of sanctions and acceptance of the outcome of next year’s election by the international community. But so far he has offered nothing of substance in return.

This suggests that his goals may not be as ambitious as they seem. Perhaps he is merely trying to reduce the pressure on his regime to tolerable levels so he can extend his hold on power a little longer. In other words, he may just be up to his old tricks, in which case, we can expect to see Suu Kyi remain under house arrest until after the election.

On the other hand, if he is genuinely interested in ensuring a safe exit for himself, he may take the risk of releasing Suu Kyi, although only after he has sufficient guarantees from her that she will not do anything to undermine his election plans. Indeed, if he really does want the election to be regarded as anything other than a sham, he will have no choice but to free Suu Kyi.

In any case, the situation is very delicate. Three key actors—Than Shwe, Suu Kyi and the US—realize this, and have played their hands very carefully. But at some point, someone will have to make a more daring move, and when this happens, it could be a game changer, or it could just force the situation back to square one.