The following interview was given by Qiu Shanhe, a Kokang expert close to the leadership that was overthrown by the Burma Army in August.
1. Some researchers say in the last twenty years, The Peace and Democratic Front (PDF) have only focused on economic development and failed to tend to political matters. That is why they fell into the “trap” set by the Burmese army. How do you respond to such criticism? What is your explanation?

To my understanding, the members of The Peace and Democratic Front (PDF) has put in the utmost effort in the last twenty years to improve the lives of the people. A lot of time and effort has been put into the development and construction of the local economy, but that doesn’t mean they have forgotten about political matters. I remember they took part in the National Convention and had many good proposals. However the Burmese military government chose to ignore them. Perhaps they were not effective or they suffered bad luck, but I do not believe they ignored political issues.

2. How is this war different from the war in 1992? Or how are they similar? Why weren’t they able to learn lessons from the war in 1992 and the Mongkoe incident in 2000? Why wasn’t it possible to avoid this war?

I think the war today is very different from the war in 1992. To my understanding, the war in 1992 was purely a civil war, although it was also provoked by Burma. According to scholars and many who are interested in Sino-Burmese border affairs, this was not a civil war.

On the day of their coup, Bai Xuoqian and his gang were defeated in a few short hours by Kokang law enforcements. Bai Xuoqian escaped into the Burmese military sub-district. When Bai was running away, the Kokang law enforcements asked Chairman Peng Jiasheng whether they should shoot Bai. Chairman Peng’s answer was to let him go. There are people in China who believe this account to be true.

I believe Bai Xuoqian’s coup was only the first step in the Burmese military’s plan to eradicate the political power of the Kokang nationals. Bai Xuoqian was only a puppet. If Kokang had accepted the Burmese Army’s proposal to transform their army into a Border Guard Force, then this war could have been avoided.

The Mongkoe incident was even more different. The Junta swooped in during the civil war in Mongkoe. The group of over three hundred people led by Li Nimen were deceived by the Junta and voluntarily handed over their weapons to the Burmese army. In the end, they were brutally killed by the Burmese Army. Not one survived.

3. People are saying in the past ten, twenty years, the focus has been on business and cooperation within the alliance have been neglected. It is speculated that this is the reason why the peace alliance is in a passive state and at a disadvantage. What are your views on this? Is there any right or wrong? Can you point out any changes that should be made?

I think the third question is similar to the first one.

4. Which of the following are major factors that contributed to the Burmese army being able to take over Kokang in three days?
a. Internal discord and struggles for power.
b. Too trusting and abiding of the mainland ( China ).
c. Over confidence in the alliance and hopeful of their assistance.
d. Over confidence in one’s own army.

I think all four factors you mentioned, more less, have some relevance to what took place.

a .. Rather than calling it a civil strife, it is more like there was a traitor amongst them. That traitor was bribed and used by the Junta. This accelerated the break out of the war.

b..To my knowledge, the peace alliance along the Sino-Burma border all trust China implicitly. The alliance believed in the bond of common history and ancestors. They believed China would step in during crucial times. They are still using views from forty years ago to look at the problems today. They forgot how the Burma communists were abandoned and how China and Vietnam were friendly but ended up in war. The foreign press reported that the Burmese government claimed they had the support and approval from China to attack Kokang. Kokang would never have imagined that this was an act of cooperation between China and Burma. According to a reliable source, this was an act of individual departments in China. They disregarded the well-being of their country and fellow nationals and were taken in by the Burmese army. A line from an article put it really well, “Oil pipes are more important than blood ties”.

c…From what I know, Kokang abided by the agreement of the alliance, so Kokang believed the members of the alliance would honor their promise. As it turned out, the other members of the alliance chose to be bystanders.

d..I believe the Kokang army are capable of battle. They knew it was a battle that could not be won, but the Kokang army still persevered and fought. Due to interference from outside parties, they evacuated from battle to avoid further injuries and harm.

5. What is the likelihood of recapturing Kokang? What are the main factors? Who would be the key people directly involved?

Regarding possibly recapturing Kokang, from my understanding, the Peng family has had its strength sapped significantly by this war. While they still care for and are greatly concerned for Kokang’s people, they do not have the desire to revisit this dispute over Kokang. However, perhaps one day there will be a new generation of young Kokang that will seek to revive Kokang’s great cause.

6. What support has China previously provided? What was accomplished? Why can China not accept ” Peng “?

From my understanding, during this Kokang war, the local government and local people of China sympathized with Kokang’s great misfortune, and provided humanitarian support. One person involved said that two days before the Burmese army opened fire on Kokang, the junta sent a special envoy to a high ranking Chinese official, offering a bribe of around USD 3 million. Also, Bai Xuoqian had previously used large sums of money to bribe the junta’s northeast regional commander as well as the sub-regional commander living in Lao Kao. At the same time, Bai also bribed police officials in Lincang’s Narcotics Control Division to blame Peng for possession of drugs and firearms. In reality, while Bai Xuoqian was colluding with both the junta and Chinese narcotics control officials, he was also the one engaging in the trading of drugs. Bai himself, his wife and his son all use drugs.

7. It is rumored that the “Wa“ and the “Mongla” do not allow “Peng” to stay with them. Is this true? Can this be verified? Why would this be the case?

From what I know, Kokang abided by the agreement of the alliance, so Kokang believed the members of the alliance would honor their promise. As it turned out, the other members of the alliance chose to be bystanders. In the end, they would not even take in the brothers of Peng, in fear of the Pengs bringing war unto them.

8. Given the situation with the Wa, what will happen to the SSA, KIA and Mongla? What preparations should they be conducting?

Because the junta is constantly seeking to divide, disintegrate and utilize every means to destroy, so what happened to Kokang could happen to any other group.

9. Since the time that he first took office, Peng has vigorously clamped down on drug-related activities, instead focusing on developing the economy and improving the living standards of Kokang’s people. Peng’s conduct and actions were known to all of the foreign organizations in Kokang. Particularly in terms of clamping down on drug activities, Peng’s actions not only received the praise of both China and Burma, but also gained the approval of the international community. What the Burmese government is saying today is in conflict with what actually happened.

10. What other forces are in Kokang borders besides DA GA SA?

During the battles, besides Da Ga Sa (Regional Operations Command Laogai), the 99 infantry (Light Infantry Division # 99), 16 infantry (Military Operations Command #16), and the Kun Nong (Kunlong) infantry also participated. As of now, no information has been heard on their retreating.

11. Is it true that Bai Xuoqian is a puppet of the junta and does not have general population’s support? Is there any proof of this? What views do you have on the future of Bai ? Do you have any predictions for the future of Kokang’s people?

From what I know, the people of Kokang recognize that it was Bai Suochen that betrayed Kokang. Even as of today, there are a large number of Kokang refugees at the Chinese border who are afraid to go back home. Bai is just a chess piece used by the Burmese army, a puppet. Now that the junta has achieved what they wanted, Bai Suochen no longer has much value. So, Bai faces a situation where he is basically on his last legs. The people of Kokang face exploitation by the junta and repressive rule, so their lives will only become filled with more suffering and difficulty than before.

12. The Junta is pressuring Meng La (Mongla), Bang Kang (Panghsang), and SSA. What are your views on their future? What are the most important and practical preparations they should do at this time? What advice do you have for them?

There are rumors along the Kokang and Chinese border that the law enforcement officials in Lincang of Yunnan Province are taking advantage of the battles led by the Junta. According to one victim, innocent refugees who escaped into China during the battles who possessed any money were arrested under the charge of drug trafficking by officials in Lincang, Yunnan. Various underhanded tactics were used to threaten and attack the refugees in order to pilfer their possessions. Large fines were also handed out. Who knows how many refugees suffered such an unreasonable and cruel fate.

Therefore the other members of the alliance should view Kokang as a warning. They must not harbor any hope or fantasies about China. China has very clearly stated that they are not a refuge for conflicts in Burma. Especially after the battles in Kokang, people should see how dark and corrupt Chinese officials are. National interests are no competition against jewels and cash. I whole heartedly advise everyone that finding another way out is the wisest thing to do.