Several months have passed since the Obama administration embarked on a policy of engagement with the Burmese regime. During this time, the United Nations, the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have all been relatively silent on Burmese issues, apparently waiting to see how the new US policy will play out.Now we are finally getting our first glimpse of what has been going on behind the scenes for the past few months. In an article published by The Washington Post on Tuesday, a senior US official is quoted as saying that so far four meetings have taken place between US and Burmese officials, with a fifth planned for the near future.

Apparently, however, it is not only Washington’s approach to Burma that has changed, but also its focus. According to the senior official, “Our most decisive interactions have been around North Korea.”

Of course, this does not mean that the US has abandoned its longstanding position on Burma, which is to insist on political dialogue between the ruling regime, the democratic opposition and ethnic minority groups as the key to national reconciliation. But now that attention has shifted away from domestic considerations into the realm of regional security, there is a danger that resolving Burma’s internal tensions will become a lower priority for the US.

Although it has repeatedly called on the Burmese regime to make the upcoming election free, fair and inclusive, the Obama administration has been noticeably short on ideas about how to deal with Burma’s democracy deficit. But rather than simply urging the US to come up with alternative approaches, perhaps it is time to offer some proposals of our own to ensure that the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people don’t take a backseat to US efforts to contain North Korea.

One area that could be singled out for improvement is Article 436, Chapter 12 of the 2008 Constitution, which deals with amending the charter. This is something that should be addressed in the first session of Parliament after the election, before tackling any of the more contentious issues that critics of this deeply flawed document have raised.

With the facilitation of an international body, the junta and the democratic opposition, led by the National League for Democracy, should sit together and seek an agreement to allow constitutional changes with the support of two-thirds of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament), rather than the three-quarters now required.

With such a change, the amendment procedure would favor neither civilian politicians nor the military-appointed representatives who hold 25 percent of the seats in Parliament—effectively giving them a veto to oppose any amendment bills they don’t like.

But to make this idea work, it must be broached as soon as possible. This is where the US can help. If US officials raised this proposal at their next meeting with their junta counterparts, they could set the stage for a dialogue between the military and the democratic opposition to gain an agreement before the election.

This negotiation could end the current political deadlock because it won’t talk about review of the Constitution before the election—something the regime has already said is completely off the table at this point. On the other hand, it will keep the door open for the opposition to address many other constitutional issues—such as the military’s leadership role in politics, the right of military leaders to independently administer and adjudicate the Armed Forces, and the right of the military to seize power in coup—sometime in the future.

Most importantly, perhaps, it could set a precedent for genuine cooperation between the junta and the opposition, allowing them to identify areas where they can compromise without giving up their basic positions.

By agreeing to a modest change in the way amendments are made to the Constitution, both sides could find that they have more to gain from working together within a parliamentary framework than by perpetuating their decades-old enmity.